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Abstract We study binary opinion dynamics in a fully connected network
of interacting agents. The agents are assumed to interact according to one
of the following rules: (1) Voter rule: An updating agent simply copies the
opinion of another randomly sampled agent; (2) Majority rule: An updating
agent samples multiple agents and adopts the majority opinion in the selected
group. We focus on the scenario where the agents are biased towards one of
the opinions called the preferred opinion. Using suitably constructed branching
processes, we show that under both rules the mean time to reach consensus
is Θ(logN), where N is the number of agents in the network. Furthermore,
under the majority rule model, we show that consensus can be achieved on the
preferred opinion with high probability even if it is initially the opinion of the
minority. We also study the majority rule model when stubborn agents with
fixed opinions are present. We find that the stationary distribution of opinions
in the network in the large system limit using mean field techniques.
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1 Introduction
The problem of social learning [4, 13] is concerned with the rate at which
social agents, interacting under simple rules, can learn/discover the true util-
ities of their choices, opinions or technologies. In this context, the two central
questions we study are: (1) Can social agents learn/adopt the better technol-
ogy/opinion through simple rules of interactions and if so, how fast? and (2)
What are the effects of the presence of stubborn agents (having fixed opinions)
on the dynamics opinion diffusion?
We consider a setting where the choices available to each agent are binary
and are represented by {0} and {1} [2,4]. These are referred to as opinions of
the agents. The interactions among the agents are modelled using two simple
rules: the voter rule [7, 10, 18] and the majority rule [5, 6, 11, 20]. In the voter
rule, an agent randomly samples one of its neighbours at an instant when it
decides to update its opinion. The updating agent then adopts the opinion of
the sampled neighbour. This simple rule captures the tendency of an individual
to mimic other individuals in the society. In the majority rule, instead of
sampling a single agent, an updating agent samples 2K (K ≥ 1) neighbours
and adopts the opinion of the majority of the sampled neighbours (including
itself). This rule captures the tendency of the individuals to conform with the
majority opinion in their local neighbourhoods.
Related literature: The voter model and its variants have been stud-
ied extensively (see [3] for a recent survey) for different network topologies,
e.g., finite integer lattices in different dimensions [10, 19], complete graphs
with three states [27], heterogeneous graphs [28], random d-regular graphs [9],
Erdos-Renyi random graphs, and random geometric graphs [32] etc. It is
known [17, 26] that if the underlying graph is connected, then the classical
voter rule leads to a consensus where all agents adopt the same opinion. Fur-
thermore, if A is the set of all agents having an opinion i ∈ {0, 1} initially,
then the probability that consensus is achieved on opinion i (referred to as the
exit probability to opinion i) is given by d(A)/2m, where d(A) is the sum of the
degrees of the vertices in A and m is the total number of edges in the graph.
It is also known that for most network topologies the mean consensus time is
Ω(N), where N is the total number of agents. In [22,31], the voter model was
studied under the presence of stubborn individuals who do not update their
opinions. In such a scenario, the network cannot reach a consensus because of
the presence of stubborn agents having both opinions. Using coalescing ran-
dom walk techniques the average opinion in the network and the variance of
opinions were computed at steady state.
The majority rule model was first studied in [15], where it was assumed
that, at every iteration, groups of random sizes are formed by the agents.
Within each group, the majority opinion is adopted by all the agents. Similar
models with fixed (odd) group size have been considered in [5, 20]. A more
general majority rule based model is analysed in [11] for complete graphs.
It has been shown that with high probability (probability tending to one as
N → ∞) consensus is achieved on the opinion with the initial majority and
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the mean time to reach consensus time is Θ(logN). The majority rule model
is studied for random d-regular graphs on N vertices in [8]. It is shown that
when the initial imbalance of between the two opinions is above c
√
1/d+ d/N ,
for some constant c > 0, then consensus is achieved in O(logN) time on the
initial majority opinion with high probability. A deterministic version of the
majority rule model, where an agent, instead of randomly sampling some of its
neighbours, adopts the majority opinion among all its neighbours, is considered
in [1,14,23,24]. In such models, given the graph structure of the network, the
opinions of the agents at any time is a deterministic function of the initial
opinions of the agents. The interest there is to find out the initial distribution
of opinions for which the network converges to some specific absorbing state.
Contributions: In all the prior works on the voter and the majority rule
models, it is assumed that opinions or technologies are indistinguishable. How-
ever, in a social learning model, one opinion/technology may be inherently
‘better’ than the other leading to more utility to individuals choosing the bet-
ter option in a round of update. As a result, individuals currently using the
better technology will update less frequently than individuals with the worse
technology. To model this scenario, we assume that an agent having opin-
ion i ∈ {0, 1} performs an update with probability qi. By choosing q1 < q0,
we make the agents ‘biased’ towards the opinion {1}, which is referred to as
the preferred opinion. We study the opinion dynamics under both voter and
majority rules when the agents are biased. We focus on the case where the
underlying graph is complete which closely models situations where agents are
mobile and can therefore sample any other agent depending on their current
neighbourhood.
For the voter model with biased agents, we show that the probability of
reaching consensus on the non-preferred opinion decreases exponentially with
the network size. Furthermore, the mean consensus time is shown to be loga-
rithmic in the network size. This is in sharp contrast to the voter model with
unbiased agents where the probability of reaching consensus on any opinion re-
mains constant and the mean consensus time grows linearly with the network
size. Therefore, in the biased voter model consensus is achieved exponentially
faster than that in the unbiased voter model.
For the majority rule model with biased agents, we show that the network
reaches consensus on the preferred opinion with high probability only if the
initial fraction of agents with the preferred opinion is above a certain threshold
determined by the biases of the agents. Furthermore, as in the voter model, the
mean consensus time is shown to be logarithmic in the network size. Our results
generalise existing results on the majority rule model with unbiased agents
where it is known that consensus is achieved (with high probability) on the
opinion with the initial majority and the mean consensus time is logarithmic
in the network size. However, existing proofs for the unbiased majority rule
model [11, 20] cannot be extended to the biased case as they crucially rely
on the fact that opinions are indistinguishable. We use suitably constructed
branching processes and monotonicity of certain rational polynomials to prove
the results for the biased model.
4 Mukhopadhyay et al.
We also study the majority rule model in the presence of agents having
fixed opinions at all times. These agents are referred to as ’stubborn’ agents.
A similar study of the voter model in the presence of stubborn agents was done
in [31]. In presence of stubborn agents, the network cannot reach a consensus
state. The key objective, therefore, is to study the stationary distribution of
opinions among the non-stubborn agents. In [31], coalescing random random
walk techniques were used to study this stationary distribution of opinions.
However, such techniques do not apply to majority rule dynamics. We analyse
the network dynamics in the large scale limit using mean field techniques. In
particular, we show that depending on the proportions of stubborn agents the
mean field can either have single or multiple equilibrium points. If multiple
equilibrium points are present, the network shows metastability in which it
switches between stable configurations spending long time in each configura-
tion.
An earlier version of this work [25], contained some of the results of this
paper and an analysis of the majority rule model for K = 1. However, only
sketches of the proofs were provided. In the current paper, we provide rigorous
proofs of all results and a more general analysis of the majority rule model
(for K ≥ 1).
Organisation: The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2,
we introduce the model with biased agents. In Sections 3 and 4, we state the
main results for the voter model and the majority rule model with biased
agents, respectively. Section 5 analyses the majority rule model with stub-
born agents. In Sections 6-10, we provide the detailed proofs the main results
on voter and majority rule models with biased agents. Finally, the paper is
concluded in Section 11.
2 Model with biased agents
We consider a network of N social agents. Opinion of each agent is assumed
to be a binary variable taking values in the set {0, 1}. Initially, every agent
adopts one of the two opinions. Each agent considers updating its opinion
at points of an independent unit rate Poisson point process associated with
itself. At a point of the Poisson process associated with itself, an agent either
updates its opinion or retains its past opinion. We assume that an agent with
opinion i ∈ {0, 1} updates its opinion at a point of the unit rate Poisson process
associated with itself with probability qi ∈ (0, 1) and retains its opinion with
probability pi = 1 − qi. To make the agents ‘biased’ towards opinion {1} we
assume that q0 > q1 which implies that an agent with opinion {1} updates its
opinion less frequently than an agent with opinion {0}.
In case the agent decides to update its opinion, it does so either using
the voter rule or under the majority rule. In the voter rule, an updating agent
samples an agent uniformly at random from N agents (with replacement) from
the network1 and adopts the opinion of the sampled agent. In the majority
1 In the large N limit sampling with or without replacement leads to the same results.
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rule, an updating agent samples 2K agents (K ≥ 1) uniformly at random
(with replacement) and adopts the opinion of the majority of the 2K + 1
agents including itself. The results derived in this paper can be extended to
the case where the updating agent samples an agent from a random group of
size O(N). However, for simplicity we only focus on the case where sampling
occurs from the whole population.
3 Main results for the voter model with biased agents
We first consider the voter model with biased agents. In this case, clearly, the
network reaches consensus in a finite time with probability 1. Our interest is
to find out the probability with which consensus is achieved on the preferred
opinion {1}. This is referred to as the exit probability of the network. We also
intend to characterise the average time to reach the consensus.
The case q1 = q0 = 1 is referred to as the voter model with unbiased agents,
which has been analysed in [7, 18]. It is known that for unbiased agents the
probability with which consensus is reached on a particular opinion is simply
equal to the initial fraction α of agents having that opinion and the expected
time to reach consensus for large N is approximately given by Nh(α), where
h(α) = −[α ln(α) + (1 − α) ln(1 − α)]. We now proceed to characterise these
quantities for the voter model with biased agents.
Let X(N)(t) denote the number of agents with opinion {1} at time t ≥
0. Clearly, X(N)(·) is a Markov process on state space {0, 1, . . . , N}, with
absorbing states 0 and N . The transition rates from state k are given by
q(k → k + 1) = q0k
N − k
N
, (1)
q(k → k − 1) = q1k
N − k
N
, (2)
where q(i → j) denotes the rate of transition from state i to state j. The
embedded discrete-time Markov chain X˜(N) for X(N) is a one-dimensional
random walk on {0, 1, . . . , N} with jump probability of p = q0/(q0+ q1) to the
right and q = 1 − p to the left. We define r = q/p < 1 and r¯ = 1/r. Let Tk
denote the first hitting time of state k, i.e.,
Tk = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : X(N)(t) ≥ k
}
, (3)
We are interested in the asymptotic behaviour of the quantities EN (α) :=
P⌊αN⌋ (TN < T0) and tN (α) = E⌊αN⌋ [T0 ∧ TN ], where Px (·) and Ex [·], re-
spectively denote the probability measure and expectation conditioned on the
event X(N)(0) = x. To characterise the above quantities we require the follow-
ing lemma which follows from the gambler ruin identity for one-dimensional
asymmetric random walks [29].
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Lemma 1 For 0 ≤ a < x < b ≤ N , we have
Px (Ta < Tb) =
rx − rb
ra − rb
. (4)
From the above lemma it follows that
EN (α) = P⌊αN⌋ (TN < T0) ,
=
1− r⌊αN⌋
1− rN
,
≥ 1− r⌊αN⌋ = 1− exp(−cN),
for some constant c > 0 (since r < 1). Hence, the probability of having a
consensus on the non-preferred opinion approaches 0 exponentially fast in N .
This is unlike the voter model with unbiased agents where the probability of
having consensus on either opinion remains constant with respect to N .
The following theorem characterises the mean time tN (α) to reach the
consensus state starting from α fraction of agents having opinion {1}.
Theorem 1 For all α ∈ (0, 1) we have tN(α) = Θ(logN).
Hence, the above theorem shows that the mean consensus time in the
biased voter model is logarithmic in the network size. This is in contrast to
the voter model with unbiased agents where the mean consensus time is linear
in the network size. Thus, with biased agents, the network reaches consensus
exponentially faster.
We now consider the measure-valued process x(N) = X(N)/N , which de-
scribes the evolution of the fraction of agents with opinion {1}. We show that
the following convergence takes place.
Theorem 2 If x(N)(0) ⇒ α, then x(N)(·) ⇒ x(·), where ⇒ denotes weak
convergence and x(·) is a deterministic process with initial condition x(0) = α
and is governed by the following differential equation
x˙(t) = (q0 − q1)x(t)(1 − x(t)), (5)
According to the above result, for large N , the process x(N)(·) is well
approximated by the deterministic process x(·) which is generally referred
to as the mean field limit of the system. Using the mean field limit, we can
approximate the mean consensus time tN (α) by the time the process x(·) takes
to reach the state 1− 1/N starting from α.
Theorem 3 1. For the process x(·) defined by (5), we have x(t)→1 as t→∞
for any x(0) ∈ (0, 1).
2. Let t(ǫ, α) denote the time required by the process x(·) to reach ǫ ∈ (0, 1)
starting from x(0) = α ∈ (0, 1). Then
t(ǫ, α) =
1
q0 − q1
(
log
ǫ
1− ǫ
− ln
α
1− α
)
. (6)
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In particular, for ǫ = 1− 1/N we have
t(1− 1/N, α) =
1
q0 − q1
log(N − 1)−
1
q0 − q1
log
(
α
1− α
)
. (7)
Proof Since q0 > q1 and x(t) ∈ (0, 1) for all t ≥ 0, we have from (5) that
x˙(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Hence, x(t)→ 1 as t→∞.
The second assertion follows directly by solving (5) with initial condition
x(0) = α. ⊓⊔
Remark 1 It is worth noting here that the process x(·) does not reach 1 in
a finite time even though the process x(N)(·) does reach 1 in a finite time
with probability 1. However, it is ‘reasonable’ to assume that tN (α) is ’closely’
approximated by t(1− 1/N, α). Such approximation of the absorption time of
an absorbing Markov chain using its corresponding mean field limit is common
in the literature [20, 27]. However, except from a few special cases, e.g. [16],
there is no general theory justifying such approximations.
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Fig. 1: Exit probability EN (α) as a function of the number of agents N . Pa-
rameters: q0 = 1, q1 = 0.5, α = 0.2.
Simulation Results: In Figure 1, we plot the exit probability for both
unbiased (q0 = q1 = 1) and biased (1 = q0 > q1 = 0.5) cases as functions of the
number of agents N for α = 0.2. As expected from our theory, we observe that
in the biased case the exit probability exponentially increases to 1 with the
increase N . This is in contrast to the unbiased case, where the exit probability
remains constant at α for all N .
In Figure 2a, we plot the mean consensus time tN(α) for both unbiased
and biased cases as a function of N for α = 0.4. We observe a good match
between the estimate obtained in Theorem 3 and the simulation results. The
observation also verifies the statement of Theorem 1. In Figure 2b, we plot the
mean consensus time as a function of α for both biased an unbiased cases. The
network size is kept fixed at N = 100. We observe that for the unbiased case,
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Fig. 2: Mean consensus time under the voter model with biased agents
the consensus time increases in the range α ∈ (0, 0.5) and decreases in the
range α ∈ (0.5, 1). In contrast, for the biased case, the consensus time steadily
decreases with the increase in α. This is expected since, in the unbiased case,
consensus is achieved faster on a particular opinion if the initial number agents
having that opinion is more than the initial number of agents having the other
opinion. On the other hand, in the biased case, consensus is achieved with
high probability on the preferred opinion and therefore increasing the initial
fraction of agents having the preferred opinion always decreases the mean
consensus time.
4 Main results for the majority rule model with biased agents
In this section, we consider the majority rule model with biased agents. As
in the voter model, it is easy to see that in this case a consensus is achieved
in a finite time with probability 1. We proceed to find the exit probability to
opinion 1 and the mean consensus time.
Let X(N)(t) denote the number of agents with opinion {1} at time t ≥ 0.
Clearly, X(N)(·) is a Markov process on state space {0, 1, . . . , N}. The jump
rates of X(N) from state n to state n+ 1 and n− 1 are given by
q(n→ n+ 1) = (N − n)q0
2K∑
i=K+1
(
2K
i
)( n
N
)i(N − n
N
)2K−i
, (8)
= (N − n)q0P
(
Bin
(
2K,
n
N
)
≥ K + 1
)
, (9)
q(n→ n− 1) = nq1
2K∑
i=K+1
(
2K
i
)(
N − n
N
)i ( n
N
)2K−i
, (10)
= nq1P
(
Bin
(
2K, 1−
n
N
)
≥ K + 1
)
, (11)
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respectively. Let X˜(N) denote the embedded Markov chain corresponding to
X(N). Then the jump probabilities for the embedded chain X˜(N) are given by
pn,n+1 = 1− pn,n−1
=
q(n→ n+ 1)
q(n→ n− 1) + q(n→ n+ 1)
=
gK(n/N)
gK(n/N) + r
, (12)
where 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1, r = q1/q0 < 1, and gK : (0, 1)→ (0,∞) is defined as
gK(x) =
1
xP (Bin(2K,x) ≥ K + 1)
1
1−xP (Bin (2K, 1− x) ≥ K + 1)
. (13)
With probability 1, X(N) gets absorbed in one of the states 0 or N in finite
time. We are interested in the probability of absorption in the state N and
the average time till absorption. We first state the following lemma which is
key to proving many of the results in this section.
Lemma 2 The function gK : (0, 1) → (0,∞) as defined by (13) is strictly
increasing and is therefore also one-to-one.
In the following theorem, we characterise the exit probability to state N .
Theorem 4 1. Let EN (n) denote the probability that the process X
(N) gets
absorbed in state N starting from state n. Then, we have
EN (n) =
∑n−1
t=0
∏t
j=1
r
gK(j/N)∑N−1
t=0
∏t
j=1
r
gK(j/N)
, (14)
2. Define EN (α) := EN (⌊αN⌋) and β := g
−1
K (r). Then EN (α) → 1 (resp.
EN (α) → 0) as N → ∞ if α > β (resp. α < β) and this convergence is
exponential in N .
Hence, a phase transition of the exit probability occurs at β = g−1K (r)
for all values of K ≥ 1. This implies, that even though the agents are biased
towards the preferred opinion, consensus may not be obtained on the preferred
opinion if the initial fraction of agents having the preferred opinion is below the
threshold β. This is in contrast to the voter model, where consensus is obtained
on the preferred opinion irrespective of the initial state. The threshold β can
be computed by solving gK(β) = r using either Newton-Raphson method or
other fixed point methods.
Remark 2 We note that for the unbiased majority rule model we have r = 1
and β = g−1K (r) = g
−1
K (1) = 1/2. Thus, the known results [11, 20] for the
majority rule model with unbiased agents are recovered.
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We now characterise the mean time tN (α) to reach the consensus state
starting from α fraction of agents having opinion {1}. As before, we define Tn to
be the random time of first hitting the state n, i.e., Tn = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : X(N)(t) ≥ n
}
.
Theorem 5 For α ∈ (0, β) ∪ (β, 1) we have tN (α) = Θ(logN).
The theorem above shows that the mean consensus time is logarithmic in
the network size. To prove the theorem we use branching processes and the
monotonicity shown in Lemma 2. Our proof does not require the indistin-
guishability of the opinions and is therefore more general than existing proofs
for the unbiased voter model [11, 20].
It is easy to derive the mean field limit corresponding to the empirical
measure process x(N) = X(N)/N . Using the transition rates of the process
X(N)(·) it can be verified that if x(N)(0)⇒ α as N →∞, then x(N)(·)⇒ x(·)
as N → ∞, where process x(·) satisfies the initial condition x(0) = α and is
governed by the following ODE:
x˙(t) = q0x(t)(1 − x(t))hK(x(t))(gK (x(t)) − r), (15)
where hK is defined as hK(x) =
∑2K
i=K+1
(
2k
i
)
(1 − x)i−1x2K−i. By definition
hK(x) > 0 for x ∈ (0, 1). Hence, from Lemma 2, it follows that the process x(·)
has three equilibrium points at 0, 1, and β, respectively. Furthermore, using
the monotonicity of gK established in Lemma 2 and the non-negativity of hK
we have that x˙(t) > 0 for x(t) > β and x˙(t) < 0 for x(t) < β. This shows that
the only stable equilibrium points of the mean field limit x(·) are 0 and 1. At
β, x(·) has an unstable equilibrium point.
Simulation Results: In Figure 3a, we plot the exit probability EN (α) as
a function of the total number N of agents in the network. The parameters
are chosen to be q0 = 1, q1 = 0.6, K = 1. For this parameter setting, we can
explicitly compute the threshold β to be β = g−1K (r) = q1/(q0+q1) = 0.375. We
observe that for α > β the exit probability exponentially increases to 1 with
the increase in N and for α < β the exit probability decreases exponentially to
zero with the increase in N . This is in accordance with the assertion made in
Theorem 4. Similarly, in Figure 3b, we plot the exit probability as a function
of the initial fraction α of agents having opinion {1} for the same parameter
setting and different values of N . The plot shows a clear phase transition at
β = 0.375. The sharpness of the transition increases as N increases.
In Figure 4a, we plot the mean consensus time under the majority rule
as a function of N for different values of α. As predicted by Theorem 5, we
find that that the mean consensus time is logarithmic in the network size. In
Figure 4b, we study the mean consensus time as a function of K for q0 =
1, q1 = 0.6, α = 0.5, N = 50. We observe that with the increase in K, the
mean time to reach consensus decreases. This is expected since the slope of
the mean field x(t) increases with K. This leads to faster convergence to the
stable equilibrium points.
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Fig. 4: Mean consensus time under majority rule with biased agents
5 Majority model with stubborn agents
In this section, we consider the majority rule model in the presence of ‘stubborn
agents’. These are agents that never update their opinions. The other agents,
referred to as the non-stubborn agents, are assumed to update their opinions
at all points of the Poisson processes associated with themselves. We focus on
the case where the updates occur according to the majority rule model. The
voter model with stubborn agents was studied before in [31] using coalescing
random walks. However, this technique does not apply to the majority rule
model. We use mean field techniques to study the opinion dynamics under the
majority rule model.
We denote by γi, i ∈ {0, 1}, the fraction of agents in network who are
stubborn and have opinion i at all times. Thus, (1 − γ0 − γ1) is fraction of
non-stubborn agents in the network. The presence of stubborn agents prevents
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the network from reaching a consensus state. This is because at all times there
are at least Nγ0 stubborn agents having opinion {0} and Nγ1 stubborn agents
having opinion {1}. Furthermore, since each non-stubborn agent may interact
with some stubborn agents at every update instant, it is always possible for
the non-stubborn agent to change its opinion. Below we characterise the equi-
librium fraction of non-stubborn agents having opinion {1} in the network for
large N using mean field techniques. For analytical tractability, we consider
the case K = 1, i.e., when an agent sample two agents at each update instant.
However, similar results hold even for larger values of K.
Let x(N)(t) denote the fraction of non-stubborn agents having opinion {1}
at time t ≥ 0. Clearly, x(N)(·) is a Markov process with possible jumps at the
points of a rate N(1 − γ0 − γ1) Poisson process. The process x
(N)(·) jumps
from the state x to the state x + 1/N(1 − γ0 − γ1) when one of the non-
stubborn agents having opinion {0} becomes active (which happens with rate
N(1−γ0−γ1)(1−x)) and samples two agents with opinion {1}. The probability
of sampling an agent having opinion {1} from the entire network is (1− γ0 −
γ1)x + γ1. Hence, the total rate at which the process transits from state x to
the state x+ 1/N(1− γ0 − γ1) is given by
q
(
x→ x+
1
N(1− γ0 − γ1)
)
= N(1 − γ0 − γ1)(1 − x)
× [(1 − γ0 − γ1)x+ γ1]
2. (16)
Similarly, the rate of the other possible transition is given by
q
(
x→ x−
1
N(1− γ0 − γ1)
)
= N(1 − γ0 − γ1)x
× [(1− γ0 − γ1)(1 − x) + γ0]
2. (17)
As in Theorem 2, it can be shown from the above transition rates that the
process x(N)(·) converges weakly to the mean field limit x(·) which satisfies
the following differential equation
x˙(t) = (1− x(t))[(1 − γ0 − γ1)x(t) + γ1]
2
− x(t)[(1 − γ0 − γ1)(1− x(t)) + γ0]
2. (18)
We now study the equilibrium distribution πN of the process x
(N)(·) for large
N via the equilibrium points of the mean field x(·).
From (18) we see that x˙(t) is a cubic polynomial in x(t). Hence, the process
x(·) can have at most three equilibrium points in [0, 1]. We first characterise
the stability of these equilibrium points.
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Proposition 1 The process x(·) defined by (18) has at least one equilibrium
point in (0, 1). Furthermore, the number of stable equilibrium points of x(·) in
(0, 1) is either two or one. If there exists only one equilibrium point of x(·) in
(0, 1), then the equilibrium point must be globally stable (attractive).
Proof Define f(x) = (1−x)[(1−γ0−γ1)x+γ1]
2−x[(1−γ0−γ1)(1−x)+γ0]
2.
Clearly, f(0) = γ21 > 0 and f(1) = −γ
2
0 < 0. Hence, there exists at least one
root of f(x) = 0 in (0, 1). This proves the existence of an equilibrium point of
x(·) in (0, 1).
Since f(x) is a cubic polynomial and f(0)f(1) < 0, either all three roots of
f(x) = 0 lie in (0, 1) or exactly one root of f(x) = 0 lies in (0, 1). Let the three
(possibly complex and non-distinct) roots of f(x) = 0 be denoted by r1, r2, r3,
respectively. By expanding f(x) we see that the coefficient of the cubic term
is −2(1− γ0 − γ1)
2. Hence, f(x) can be written as
f(x) = −2(1− γ0 − γ1)
2(x− r1)(x− r2)(x− r3). (19)
We first consider the case when 0 < r1, r2, r3 < 1 and not all of them are
equal. Let us suppose, without loss of generality, that the roots are arranged
in the increasing order, i.e., 0 < r1 ≤ r2 < r3 < 1 or 0 < r1 < r2 ≤ r3 < 1.
From (19) and (18), it is clear that, if x(t) > r2 and x(t) > r3, then x˙(t) < 0.
Similarly, if x(t) > r2 and x(t) < r3, then x˙(t) > 0 . Hence, if x(0) > r2 then
x(t) → r3 as t → ∞. Using similar arguments we have that for x(0) < r2,
x(t) → r1 as t → ∞. Hence, r1, r3 are the stable equilibrium points of x(·).
This proves that there exist at most two stable equilibrium points of the mean
field x(·).
Now suppose that there exists only one equilibrium point of x(·) in (0, 1).
This is possible either i) if there exists exactly one real root of f(x) = 0 in
(0, 1), or ii) if all the roots of f(x) = 0 are equal and lie in (0, 1). Let r1 be
a root of f(x) = 0 in (0, 1). Now by expanding f(x) from (19), we see that
the product of the roots must be γ21/2(1 − γ0 − γ1)
2 > 0. This implies that
the other roots, r2 and r3, must satisfy one of the following conditions: 1)
r2, r3 > 1, 2) r2, r3 < 0, 3) r2, r3 are complex conjugates, 4) r2 = r3 = r1.
In all the above cases, we have that (x − r2)(x − r3) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]
with equality if and only if x = r1 = r2 = r3. Hence, from (19) and (18), it is
easy to see that x˙(t) > 0 when 0 ≤ x(t) < r1 and x˙(t) < 0 when 1 ≥ x(t) > r1.
This implies that x(t) → r1 for all x(0) ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, r1 is globally
stable.
In the next proposition, we provide the conditions on γ0 and γ1 for which
there exist multiple stable equilibrium points of the mean field x(·).
Proposition 2 There exist two distinct stable equilibrium points of the mean
field x(·) in (0, 1) if and only if
1. D(γ0, γ1) = (γ0 − γ1)
2 + 3(1− 2γ0 − 2γ1) > 0
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2. 0 < z1, z2 < 1, where
z1 =
(3− γ0 − 5γ1) +
√
D(γ0, γ1)
6(1− γ0 − γ1)
, (20)
z2 =
(3− γ0 − 5γ1)−
√
D(γ0, γ1)
6(1− γ0 − γ1)
. (21)
3. f(z1)f(z2) ≤ 0, where f(x) = (1 − x)[(1 − γ0 − γ1)x + γ1]
2 − x[(1 − γ0 −
γ1)(1− x) + γ0]
2.
If any one of the above conditions is not satisfied then x(·) has a unique,
globally stable equilibrium point in (0, 1).
Proof From Proposition 1, we have seen that x(·) has two stable equilibrium
points in (0, 1) if and only if f(x) = 0 has three real roots in (0, 1) among
which at least two are distinct. This happens if and only if f ′(x) = 0 has two
distinct real roots z1, z2 in the interval (0, 1) and f(z1)f(z2) ≤ 0. Since f
′(x)
is a quadratic polynomial in x, the above conditions are satisfied if and only if
1. The discriminant of f ′(x) = 0 is positive. This corresponds to the first
condition of the proposition.
2. The two roots z1, z2 of f
′(x) = 0 must lie in (0, 1). This corresponds to the
second condition of the proposition.
3. f(z1)f(z2) ≤ 0. This is the third condition of the proposition.
Clearly, if any one of the above conditions is not satisfied, then x(·) has a
unique equilibrium point in (0, 1). According to Proposition 1 this equilibrium
point must be globally stable.
Hence, depending on the values of γ0 and γ1 there may exist of multiple
stable equilibrium points of the mean field x(·). However, for every finite N ,
the process x(N)(·) has a unique stationary distribution πN (since it is irre-
ducible on a finite state space). In the next result, we establish that any limit
point of the sequence of stationary probability distributions (πN )N is a convex
combination of the Dirac measures concentrated on the equilibrium points of
the mean field x(·) in [0, 1].
Theorem 6 Any limit point of the sequence of probability measures (πN )N is
a convex combination of the Dirac measures concentrated on the equilibrium
points of x(·) in [0, 1]. In particular, if there exists a unique equilibrium point r
of x(·) in [0, 1] then πN ⇒ δr, where δr denotes the Dirac measure concentrated
at the point r.
Proof We first note that since the sequence of probability measures (πN )N
is defined on the compact space [0, 1], it must be tight. Hence, Prokhorov’s
theorem implies that (πN )N is relatively compact. Let π be any limit point of
the sequence (πN )N . Then by the mean field convergence result we know that
π must be an invariant distribution of the maps α 7→ x(t, α) for all t ≥ 0, i.e.,
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∫
ϕ(x(t, α))dπ(α) =
∫
ϕ(α)dπ(α), for all t ≥ 0, and all continuous (and hence
bounded) functions ϕ : [0, 1] 7→ R. In the above, x(t, α) denotes the process
x(·) started at x(0) = α. Hence we have
∫
ϕ(α)dπ(α) = lim
t→∞
∫
ϕ(x(t, α))dπ(α) (22)
=
∫
ϕ
(
lim
t→∞
x(t, α)
)
dπ(α). (23)
The second equality follows from the first by the Dominated convergence theo-
rem and the continuity of ϕ. Now, let r1, r2, and r3 denote the three equilibrium
points of the mean field x(·). Hence, by Proposition 1 we have that for each
α ∈ [0, 1], ϕ(limt→∞ x(t, α)) = ϕ(r1)INr1 (α) + ϕ(r2)INr2 (α) + ϕ(r3)INr3 (α),
where for i = 1, 2, 3, Nri ∈ [0, 1] denotes the set for which if x(0) ∈ Nri then
x(t) → ri as t→ ∞, and I denotes the indicator function. Hence, by (23) we
have that for all continuous functions ϕ : [0, 1] 7→ R
∫
ϕ(α)dπ(α) = ϕ(r1)π(Nr1) + ϕ(r2)π(Nr2) + ϕ(r3)π(Nr3). (24)
This proves that π must be of the form π = c1δr1 + c2δr2 + c3δr3 , where
c1, c2, c3 ∈ [0, 1] are such that c1 + c2 + c3 = 1. This completes the proof.
Thus, according to the above theorem, if there exists a unique equilibrium
point of the process x(·) in [0,1], then the sequence of stationary distributions
(πN )N concentrates on that equilibrium point as N →∞. In other words, for
large N , the fraction of non-stubborn agents having opinion {1} (at equilib-
rium) will approximately be equal to the unique equilibrium point of the mean
field.
Simulation Results: In Figure 5, we plot the equilibrium point of x(·)
(when it is unique) as a function of the fraction γ1 of agents having opinion
{1} who are stubborn keeping the fraction γ0 of stubborn agents having opin-
ion {0} fixed. We choose the parameter values so that there exists a unique
equilibrium point of x(·) in [0, 1] (such parameter settings can be obtained
using the conditions of Proposition 2). We see that as γ1 is increased in the
range (0, 1− γ0), the equilibrium point shifts closer to unity. This is expected
since increasing the fraction of stubborn agents with opinion {1} increases the
probability with which a non-stubborn agent samples an agent with opinion
{1} at an update instant.
If there exist multiple equilibrium points of the process x(·) then the con-
vergence x(N)(·)⇒ x(·) implies that at steady state the process x(N)(·) spends
intervals near the region corresponding to one of the stable equilibrium points
of x(·). Then due to some rare events, it reaches, via the unstable equilib-
rium point, to a region corresponding to the other stable equilibrium point of
x(·). This fluctuation repeats giving the process x(N)(·) a unique stationary
distribution. This behavior is formally known as metastability.
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Fig. 5: Majority rule with stubborn agents: Equilibrium point of x(·) as a
function of γ1 for different values of γ0.
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Fig. 6: Majority rule with stubborn agents: Sample path of the process x(N)(·)
with N = 100, γ0 = γ1 = 0.2.
To demonstrate metastability, we simulate a network with N = 100 agents
and γ0 = γ1 = 0.2. For the above parameters, the mean field x(·) has two stable
equilibrium points at 0.127322 and 0.872678. In Figure 6, we show the sample
path of the process x(N)(·). We see that at steady state the process switches
back and forth between regions corresponding to the stable equilibrium points
of x(·). This provides numerical evidence of the metastable behavior of the
finite system.
6 Proof of Theorem 1
Let T = T0 ∧ TN denote the random time to reach consensus. Then we have
T =
N−1∑
k=1
Zk∑
j=1
Mk,j , (25)
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where Zk denotes the number of visits to state k before absorption and Mk,j
denotes the time spent in the jth visit to state k. Clearly, the random vari-
ables Zk and (Mk,j)j≥1 are independent with each Mk,j being an exponential
random variable with rate (q0 + q1)k(N − k)/N . Hence, using Wald’s identity
we have
tN (α) = E⌊αN⌋ [T ] (26)
=
N−1∑
k=1
E⌊αN⌋ [Zk]E⌊αN⌋ [Mk,j ] (27)
=
1
q0 + q1
N−1∑
k=1
(
1
k
+
1
N − k
)
E⌊αN⌋ [Zk] . (28)
We now proceed to find lower and upper bounds of tN (α).
Let A = {ω : TN (ω) < T0(ω)} denote the event that the Markov chain gets
absorbed in state N . We have
E⌊αN⌋ [Zk] = E⌊αN⌋ [Zk|A]P⌊αN⌋ (A) + E⌊αN⌋ [Zk|A
c] (1− P⌊αN⌋ (A)). (29)
Lower bound of tN (α): We first obtain a lower bound for tN (α). Clearly, we
have the following
Zk|A ≥ 1 ∀k ≥ ⌊αN⌋
Zk|A
c ≥ 0 ∀k > ⌊αN⌋
Zk|A ≥ 0 ∀k < ⌊αN⌋
Zk|A
c ≥ 1 ∀k ≤ ⌊αN⌋ .
Using the above in (29) we have
E⌊αN⌋ [Zk] ≥ P⌊αN⌋ (A)1{k≥⌊αN⌋} + (1− P⌊αN⌋ (A))1{k≤⌊αN⌋},
where 1Ω denotes the indicator function for the set Ω. Using the above in
(28), we have
tN (α) ≥
P⌊αN⌋ (A)
q0 + q1
N−1∑
k=⌊αN⌋
(
1
k
+
1
N − k
)
+
1− P⌊αN⌋ (A)
q0 + q1
⌊αN⌋∑
k=1
(
1
k
+
1
N − k
)
(30)
≥
1
q0 + q1
N(α∧(1−α))∑
k=1
1
k
(31)
>
1
q0 + q1
log(N(α ∧ (1− α))). (32)
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Upper bound for tN (α): We first obtain an upper bound on Ex [Zk;A] for k ≥ x
with any 0 < x < N . Given A, let ζk denote the number of times the embedded
chain X˜(N) jumps from k to k− 1 before absorption. It is easy to observe that
conditioned on A, the embedded chain X˜(N) is a Markov chain with jump
probabilities given by
pAk,k+1 = 1− p
A
k,k−1 = p
Pk+1 (A)
Pk (A)
(a)
= p
1− rk+1
1− rk
, (33)
where equality (a) follows from Lemma 1. Furthermore, we have
Zk|A = 1 + ζk + ζk+1, for x ≤ k ≤ N − 1. (34)
The above relationship follows by observing that the facts that (i) the states
k ≥ x are visited at least once and (ii) the number of visits to state k is the
sum of the numbers of jumps of X˜(N) to the left and to the right from state
k.
Given A, we must have ζN = 0. Let ξl,k denote the random number of
left-jumps from state k between lth and (l + 1)th left-jumps from state k + 1.
Then (ξl,k)l≥0 are i.i.d with geometric distribution having mean p
A
k,k−1/p
A
k,k+1.
Moreover, we have the following recursion
ζk =
ζk+1∑
l=0
ξl,k, for x ≤ k ≤ N − 1, (35)
(the above sum starts from l = 0 because for k ≥ x left jumps from j can
occur even before the chain visits j + 1 for the first time) Thus, we see that
(ζk)x≤k≤N forms a branching process with immigration of one individual in
each generation. Applying Wald’s identity to solve the above recursion we have
for x ≤ k ≤ N − 1
Ex [ζk] =
N−1∑
n=k
n∏
i=k
pAi,i−1
pAi,i+1
(a)
=
N−1∑
n=k
n∏
i=k
r(1 − ri−1)
1− ri+1
=
r(1 − rk−1)(1− rN−k)
(1− r)(1 − rN )
, (36)
where equality (a) follows from (33). Taking expectation in (34) and substi-
tuting (36) we obtain that for x ≤ k ≤ N − 1
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Ex [Zk|A] = 1 + Ex [ζk] + Ex [ζk+1]
=
1 + r
1− r
(1− rN−k)(1− rk)
1− rN
≤
1 + r
1− r
. (37)
But we also have
Ex [Zk;A] ≤ Ex [Zk|A] ≤
1 + r
1− r
.
which provides the required bound on Ex [Zk;A]. We note that the above
bound is independent of x. In particular, it is true when x = ⌊αN⌋ and
k ≥ ⌊αN⌋.
For 1 ≤ k < x we have
Ex [Zk;A] = Ex [Zk;Tk < TN < T0] ,
= Ex [Zk|Tk < TN < T0]Px (Tk < TN < T0) ,
(a)
= Ek [Zk|TN < T0]Px (Tk < TN < T0) ,
(b)
≤
1 + r
1− r
,
where the equality (a) follows from the Markov property and inequality (b)
follows from (37). Hence, combining all the results above we have that for all
0 < k < N
Ex [Zk;A] ≤
1 + r
1− r
.
Using similar arguments for the process conditioned on Ac, it follows that
for any 0 < x < N and any 0 < k ≤ x we have
Ex [Zk;A
c] ≤ Ex [Zk|A
c]
=
r¯ + 1
r¯ − 1
(r¯N−k − 1)(r¯k − 1)
r¯N − 1
≤
1 + r
1− r
.
Furthermore, for N > k > x we have
Ex [Zk;A
c] = Ex [Zk;Tk < T0 < TN ]
= Ex [Zk|Tk < T0 < TN ]Px(Tk < T0 < TN)
= Ek [Zk|T0 < TN ]Px(Tk < T0 < TN)
≤
1 + r
1− r
.
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Combining all the above results we have E⌊αN⌋ [Zk] ≤ (1 + r)/(1 − r) for
all 0 < k < N . Hence from (28) we obtain
tN (α) ≤
2
q0 + q1
1 + r
1− r
N−1∑
k=1
1
k
,
≤
2
q0 + q1
1 + r
1− r
(log(N − 1) + 1),
which completes the proof.
7 Proof of Theorem 2
The process x(N)(·) jumps from the state x to the state x + 1/N when one
of the N(1 − x) agents having opinion {0} updates (with probability q0) its
opinion by interacting with an agent with opinion {1}. Since the agents update
their opinions at points of independent unit rate Poisson processes, the rate
at which one of the N(1− x) agents having opinion {0} decides to update its
opinion is N(1−x)q0. The probability with which the updating agent interacts
with an agent with opinion {1} is x. Hence, the total rate of transition from
x to x + 1/N is given by r(x → x + 1/N) = q0Nx(1− x). Similarly, the rate
of transition from x to x − 1/N is given by r(x → x − 1/N) = q1Nx(1− x).
From the above transition rates it can be easily seen that the generator of
the process x(N)(·) converges uniformly as N → ∞ to the generator of the
deterministic process x(·) defined by (5). From the classical results (see e.g.,
Kurtz [21]), the theorem follows.
8 Proof of Lemma 2
We can write gK(x) = φ(ψ(x)), where ψ(x) =
x
1−x : [0, 1)→ [0,∞) and
φ(t) =
∑2K
i=K+1
(
2K
i
)
ti∑2K
i=K+1
(
2K
i
)
t2K+1−i
=
∑2K
i=K+1
(
2K
i
)
ti∑K
i=1
(
2K
i−1
)
ti
.
Clearly, ψ(x) : [0, 1) → [0,∞) is strictly increasing. Thus, it is sufficient to
show that φ : (0,∞) → (0,∞) is also strictly increasing. Clearly, φ′(t) =
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A(t)/(
∑K
i=1
(
2K
i−1
)
ti)2, where
A(t) =
(
2K∑
i=K+1
i
(
2K
i
)
ti−1
)(
K∑
i=1
(
2K
i− 1
)
ti
)
−
(
2K∑
i=K+1
(
2K
i
)
ti
)(
K∑
i=1
i
(
2K
i− 1
)
ti−1
)
=
3K−1∑
j=K+1
Mjt
j (38)
with
Mj =
max(K,j−K)∑
i=min(1,j+1−2K)
(
2K
i− 1
)(
2K
j − i+ 1
)
(j + 1− 2i).
We note that in the above sum the running variable i satisfies i ≤ max(K, j−
K). Furthermore, from (38), we have that K + 1 ≤ j ≤ 3K − 1. Hence, we
have i ≤ max(K, j −K) < j+12 for any K ≥ 1. This implies that Mj > 0 for
all j satisfying K + 1 ≤ j ≤ 3K − 1 Hence, φ′(t) > 0, ∀t > 0, which implies
that φ(t) is strictly increasing in (0,∞).
9 Proof of Theorem 4
From the first step analysis of the embedded chain X˜(N)(·) it follows that
EN (n) = pn,n+1EN (n+ 1) + pn,n−1EN (n− 1), (39)
which upon rearranging gives
EN (n+ 1)− EN (n) =
pn,n−1
pn,n+1
(EN (n)− EN (n− 1)). (40)
Putting DN (n) = EN (n+1)−EN(n) we find that (40) reduces to a first order
recursion in DN (n) which satisfies the following relation for 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1
DN (n) = r
1
gK(n/N)
DN(n− 1). (41)
To compute DN(0) we use the boundary conditions EN (0) = 0 and EN (N) =
1, which imply that
∑N−1
n=0 DN (n) = 1. Hence, we have
DN(0) =
1∑N−1
t=0
∏t
j=1
r
gK(j/N)
, (42)
Thus, using EN (n) =
∑n−1
k=0 DN (k) we have the required expression for
EN (n) for all 0 ≤ n ≤ N .
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It is also important to note that DN defines a probability distribution on
the set {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. Furthermore, using the monotonicity of gK proved
in Lemma 2 and (41) we have
DN (n) < DN (n− 1) for n ≥ ⌊βN⌋+ 1,
DN (n) > DN (n− 1) for n ≤ ⌊βN⌋ .
Thus, the mode of the distribution DN is at ⌊βN⌋. Now for any α > β we
choose β′ such that α > β′ > β. Hence, by the monotonicity of gK we have
r′ :=
r
gK(β′)
<
r
gK(β)
= 1.
Also using the monotonicity of gK and (41) we have for any j ≥ 1
DN (⌊β
′N⌋+ j) ≤

 r
gK
(
⌊β′N⌋+1
N
)


j
DN (⌊β
′N⌋)
≤ (r′)jDN(⌊β
′N⌋),
where the last step follows since β′N < ⌊β′N⌋+ 1. Hence, we have
EN (α) =
⌊αN⌋−1∑
t=0
DN(t)
= 1−
N−1∑
t=⌊Nα⌋
DN (t)
≥ 1−DN (⌊β
′N⌋)(r′)⌊αN⌋−⌊β
′N⌋
N−1−⌊αN⌋∑
t=0
(r′)t
≥ 1− (r′)⌊αN⌋−⌊β
′N⌋ 1− (r
′)N−⌊αN⌋
1− r′
→ 1 as N →∞.
The proof for α < β follows similarly.
10 Proof of Theorem 5
Let T = T0 ∧ TN denote the random time to reach consensus. Then we have
T =
N−1∑
n=1
Zn∑
j=1
Mn,j , (43)
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where Zn denotes the number of visits to state n before absorption and Mn,j
denotes the time spent in the jth visit to state n. Clearly, the random vari-
ables Zn and (Mn,j)j≥1 are independent with each Mn,j being an exponential
random variable with rate q(n→ n+1)+ q(n→ n− 1). Using Wald’s identity
we have
tN(α) = E⌊αN⌋ [T ]
=
N−1∑
n=1
E⌊αN⌋ [Zn]E⌊αN⌋ [Mn,j]
=
N−1∑
n=1
E⌊αN⌋ [Zn]
(q(n→ n+ 1) + q(n→ n− 1))
. (44)
Below we find lower and upper bounds of tN (α). Let A = {ω : TN (ω) < T0(ω)}
denote the event that the Markov chain gets absorbed in state N . We have
E⌊αN⌋ [Zn] = E⌊αN⌋ [Zn|A]P⌊αN⌋ (A)
+ E⌊αN⌋ [Zn|A
c] (1− P⌊αN⌋ (A)). (45)
Lower bound of tN (α): Applying Markov inequality to the RHS of (9) and
(11) we obtain
q(n→ n+ 1) + q(n→ n− 1) ≤ (N − n)q0
2K nN
K + 1
+ nq1
2K
(
1− nN
)
K + 1
= (q0 + q1)
2K
K + 1
N(N − n)
N
.
Furthermore, as in the case of voter model, we have
E⌊αN⌋ [Zn] ≥ P⌊αN⌋ (A)1{n≥⌊αN⌋} + (1− P⌊αN⌋ (A))1{n≤⌊αN⌋}.
Using (44) and the above inequalities we obtain
tN (α) ≥
P⌊αN⌋ (A)
q0 + q1
K + 1
2K
N−1∑
n=⌊αN⌋
(
1
n
+
1
N − n
)
+
1− P⌊αN⌋ (A)
q0 + q1
K + 1
2K
⌊αN⌋∑
n=1
(
1
n
+
1
N − n
)
≥
1
q0 + q1
K + 1
2K
N(α∧(1−α))∑
n=1
1
n
>
1
q0 + q1
K + 1
2K
log(N(α ∧ (1− α))).
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Upper bound for tN (α): From (9) and (11) we have
q(n→ n+ 1) + q(n→ n− 1) ≥
{
cn, for nN ≤
1
2 ,
c(N − n), for nN >
1
2 ,
(46)
where c = q1P
(
Bin
(
2K, 12
)
≥ K + 1
)
. Using the above inequalities in (44) we
have
tN (α) ≤
⌊N/2⌋∑
n=1
E⌊αN⌋ [Zn]
cn
+
N−1∑
n=⌊N/2⌋+1
E⌊αN⌋ [Zn]
c(N − n)
(47)
Hence, to show that tN (α) = Θ(logN) it is sufficient to show that E⌊αN⌋ [Zn] =
O(1) for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1.
For the rest of the proof we assume α > β. The case α < β can be handled
similarly.
Let x = ⌊αN⌋. We first find upper bound of Ex [Zn;A]. Conditioned on A,
the embedded chain X˜(N) is a Markov chain with jump probabilities given by
pAn,n+1 = 1− p
A
n,n−1 = pn,n+1
Pn+1 (A)
Pn (A)
. (48)
We have
pAn,n−1
pAn,n+1
=
pn,n−1
pn,n+1
Pn−1 (A)
Pn+1 (A)
, (49)
(a)
=
r
gK
(
n
N
)
∑n−2
t=0
∏t
j=1
r
gK(j/N)∑n
t=0
∏t
j=1
r
gK(j/N)
, (50)
(b)
≤ min
(
1,
r
gK
(
n
N
)
)
, (51)
where equality (a) follows from (12) and Theorem 4. Inequality (b) follows from
the facts (i) Pn−1 (A) ≤ Pn+1 (A) and (ii) for a monotonically non-increasing
non-negative sequence (yn)n≥1 the following inequality holds
yn
∑n−2
t=0
∏t
j=1 yj∑n
t=0
∏t
j=1 yj
≤ 1
(follows simply by comparing the terms in the numerator with the middle n−1
terms in the denominator).
Given A, let ζn denote the number of times the embedded chain X˜
(N)
jumps from n to n− 1 before absorption. Then as in the voter model we have
Zn|A =
{
1 + ζn + ζn+1, for x ≤ n ≤ N − 1,
ζn + ζn+1, for 1 ≤ n < x,
(52)
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where ζn follows the recursion
ζn =
{∑ζn+1
l=0 ξl,n, for x ≤ n ≤ N − 1,∑ζn+1
l=1 ξl,n, for 1 ≤ n < x
(53)
with ζN = 0 and ξl,n denoting the random number of left-jumps from state
n between lth and (l + 1)th left-jumps from state n + 1. Clearly (ξl,n)l≥0 are
i.i.d with geometric distribution having mean pAn,n−1/p
A
n,n+1. Hence, applying
Wald’s identity to solve the above recursion we have
Ex [ζn] =


∑N−1
t=n
∏t
i=n
pAi,i−1
pA
i,i+1
, for x ≤ n ≤ N − 1(∏x−1
i=n
pAi,i−1
pA
i,i+1
)
Ex [ζx] , for 1 ≤ n < x.
(54)
Now using inequality (51), monotonicity of gK , and the fact that for n ≥ x =
⌊αN⌋ > ⌊βN⌋, 1 > rα := r/gK(α) ≥ r/gK(n/N) we have for n ≥ x = ⌊αN⌋
Ex [ζn] ≤ rα + r
2
α + . . .+ r
N−n
α ≤
rα
1− rα
. (55)
Hence, using (52) we have for n ≥ x = ⌊αN⌋
Ex [Zn;A] ≤ Ex [Zn|A] ≤
1 + rα
1− rα
= O(1). (56)
For n < x = ⌊αN⌋ we have
Ex [ζn]
(a)
≤ Ex [ζx]
(b)
≤
rα
1− rα
, (57)
where (a) follows from (54) and (51) and (b) follows from (55). Hence, from
(52) we have for n < x = ⌊αN⌋
Ex [Zn;A] ≤ Ex [Zn|A] ≤
2rα
1− rα
= O(1). (58)
Similarly, conditioned on Ac we have
Zn|A
c =
{
1 + ζ¯n + ζ¯n−1 for 1 ≤ n ≤ x,
ζ¯n + ζ¯n−1 for x < n < N − 1,
(59)
where ζ¯n denotes the number of times X˜
(N) jumps to the right from state n
given Ac. Hence, ζ¯n follows the recursion given by
ζ¯n =
{∑ζ¯n−1
l=0 ξ¯l,n, for 1 ≤ n ≤ x,∑ζ¯n−1
l=1 ξ¯l,n, for x < n < N − 1
(60)
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where ζ¯0 = 0 and ξ¯l,n denotes the random number of right-jumps from state n
between lth and (l+1)th right-jumps from state n−1 given Ac. Clearly (ξ¯l,n)l≥0
are i.i.d. with geometric distribution having mean pA
c
n,n+1/p
Ac
n,n−1 where
pA
c
n,n+1 = 1− p
Ac
n,n−1 = pn,n+1
Pn+1 (A
c)
Pn (Ac)
. (61)
As before, we have
pA
c
n,n+1
pA
c
n,n−1
=
gK
(
n
N
)
r
∑N−1
t=n+1
∏N−1
j=t+1
gK(j/N)
r∑N−1
t=n−1
∏N−1
j=t+1
gK(j/N)
r
≤min
(
1,
gK
(
n
N
)
r
)
, (62)
Solving (60) using Wald’s identity we obtain
Ex
[
ζ¯n
]
=


∑n
t=1
∏n
i=t
pA
c
i,i+1
pA
c
i,i−1
, for 1 ≤ n ≤ x,(∏n
i=x+1
pA
c
i,i+1
pA
c
i,i−1
)
Ex
[
ζ¯x
]
, for x < n < N − 1.
(63)
For 1 ≤ n ≤ x after some simplification of (63) we obtain
Ex
[
ζ¯n
]
=
∏n
j=1
gK(j/N)
r∏N−1
j=1
gK(j/N)
r
Pn+1 (A
c) (1− Pn (A
c)) . (64)
We observe that for j ≤ ⌊βN⌋ we have gK(j/N)r ≤ 1 and using the fact that
gK(x) = 1/gK(1− x) we have
∏N−1
j=1
gK(j/N)
r = 1/r
N−1. Hence, using (64) for
n ≤ ⌊βN⌋ we have
Ex
[
ζ¯n
]
≤
∏n
j=1
gK(j/N)
r∏N−1
j=1
gK(j/N)
r
≤ rN−1 ≤ 1. (65)
Furthermore, for ⌊βN⌋ < n ≤ x we have
Ex
[
ζ¯n
]
≤
1∏N−1
j=n+1
gK(j/N)
r
(a)
≤ 1, (66)
where (a) follows from the fact that gK(j/N)r ≥ 1 for j > n > ⌊βN⌋. Hence, we
have shown that Ex
[
ζ¯n
]
= O(1) for 1 ≤ n ≤ x. Now, using (63) and inequality
(62) we have for x < n < N − 1 that Ex
[
ζ¯n
]
≤ Ex
[
ζ¯x
]
= O(1). Hence, from
(59) we see that Ex [Zn;A
c] ≤ Ex [Zn|A
c] = O(1) thereby completing the
proof.
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11 Conclusion
In this paper, we analysed the voter model the majority rule model of social
interaction under the presence of biased and stubborn agents. We observed
that for the voter model the presence of biased agents, reduces the mean con-
sensus time exponentially in comparison to the voter model with unbiased
agents. For the majority rule model with biased agents, we saw that the net-
work reaches the consensus state with all agents adopting the preferred opinion
only if the initial fraction of agents having the preferred opinion is more than
a certain threshold value. Finally, we have seen that for the majority rule
model with stubborn agents the network exhibits metastability, where it fluc-
tuates between multiple stable configuration, spending long intervals in each
configuration.
Several interesting directions for future work exist. For example, the be-
haviour of random d-regular networks under the biased voter and majority
rule models has not been analysed yet. Furthermore, the effect of the presence
of more than two opinion on the opinion dynamics is unknown. It will be also
interesting to study the networks dynamics under the majority rule model for
general network topologies when stubborn agents are present.
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